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PRIVACY RIGHTS, SCHOOL CHOICE, 
AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
Lawrence Lee Oldaker· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From its seventeenth-century Puritan New England 
inception, the nation's system of public schools has been called 
upon to provide an ever-expanding array of academic and 
non-instructional services. This near-monopolistic 
governmental activity has drawn continuous social commentary 
from its beginning to the present day. On one side, a stable, 
majority following has supported public school programs 
through the years. Others have challenged basic public 
education purpose, process, and achievement. Educational 
reform activities are occurring with increasing intensity at 
federal, state, and local levels. 
School improvement plans in the 1970s and 80s called for 
higher educational outcomes without general agreement on 
specific proposals to correct low performance. The 1983 "A 
Nation at Risk" study created anxious stirrings within the 
educational community and exposed discernible gaps between 
the rhetoric and the realities of meaningful change in school 
programming. 1 
Later, a second generation of critics moved to improve 
conditions in the national education colossus by decentralizing 
policy making and control, especially in the larger school units. 
In the wings, a third wave of reformers decried the futility of 
top-down managerial adjustment and championed parental 
choice among schools.2 
This latest ground swell to improve American education 
centers on the adoption of consumer values in choosing schools. 
To many, the notion of competition for pupil enrollment would 
* Dr. Oldaker is an associate professor of education and Head of the 
Graduate Programs in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the University 
of Alaska Southeast in Juneau, Alaska. 
1. For an illustrated scenario of why reforms fail, see MYRON LIEBERMAN, 
PRIVATIZATION & EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 14-21 (1989). A thoughtful analysis of the 
pervasive complexities in reforming school administration training programs 
appears in Daniel L. Duke, The Rhetoric and the Reality of Reform in Educational 
Administration, Phi Delta Kappan, June 1992, at 764-770. 
2. G. ALFRED HESS, JR., Basis for Restructuring Schools. in ScHOOL 
RESTRUCTURING, CHICAGO STYLE (1991). 
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reward exemplary programs, highlight promising community 
innovations, and force alterations in undesirable operations. 
School choice advocates include President George Bush and 
Education Secretary Lamar Alexander, who introduced the 
"America 2000" legislative plan to affed six reform goals for 
education set forth in the 1989 Charlottesville, Virginia 
conference on education. The federal initiatives, unveiled two 
years later would place a "heavy emphasis on 'parental choice,' 
a euphemism for vouchers for private and parochial schools."3 
As our Congress debates the legislative merits of school 
choice in the "America 2000" measure, related questions 
surface concerning the rights of parents, the governance of 
education, and the constitutional implications of reform 
incentives coming from the federal executive branch. Among 
serious civic issues to be resolved are the following: 
(1) Do parents have a natural right of privacy in selecting 
the manner in which they raise children? 
(2) Is education one of these rights, thereby giving credence 
to parental school selection? 
(3) Are the Federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment4 
unenumerated rights the appropriate authority for school 
choice plans? 
( 4) If the choice issue becomes a Ninth Amendment issue, 
what are the implications for traditional school governance? 
( 5) Should choice in schooling be viewed as an emerging 
Ninth Amendment right, how can public education as a Tenth 
Amendment5 function coexist under two constitutional 
amendments? 
The purpose of this paper is to address these queries by 
exploring the foundations of rights-theory relative to the 
constitutional laws that govern our contemporary public school 
systems. Responses to these questions should contribute to the 
general understanding of the political forces reshaping the 
nation's schools. 
3. Nick Pennington, Don't Look to Congress for Systemic Reform Plans, THE 
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, June 1992, at 24. 
4. The Ninth Amendment states "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of 
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
5. The Tenth Amendment states "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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II. THE ENDURING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS 
In pre-recorded times, kindred families made significant 
social compacts. Individuals willingly surrendered natural 
rights to gain protection from harm and to benefit from the 
collective labor of a larger group. Important agreements were 
reached to confirm the social order's leader, to determine the 
relationships of rights and responsibilities among those in the 
group, and to organize the community for the common good. 
Once adopted, this conduct was perpetuated as memories, 
customs, and traditions by leaders and storytellers. Much later, 
written languages aided philosophers and scholars in recording 
their thoughts and in sharing their ideas with others about the 
merits of their society. Through the ages, many philosophers 
went beyond merely describing their social orders to 
prescribing "utopian" relationships based on their perception of 
an ideal society. 
Hammurabi, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, 
and other ancient and medieval scholar-philosophers believed 
that society was governed by reason and strong, natural 
codes. 6 Nat ural law and governance continued to be a 
dominant theme among European thinkers contemplating the 
ideal citizen under a central government. St. Thomas Aquinas 7 
envisioned natural laws as being eternal, unchangeable, 
universal, distinguishable from civil laws, and emanating from 
God. This concept became the unifying force that (1) made the 
Justinian code8 cohesive and (2) supported the individual's 
corporate union with others in common social institutions, 
notably the Church of Rome. This fusion of classical and 
Christian thought provided a rational blend of state and 
church.9 For a time, rights-theorists and their probing 
questions regarding the source and placement of natural rights 
were quieted. 
6. Fourteenth century Moslem historian-philosopher Ibn Khaldoun contributed 
to the eventual development of the social sciences with an insistence that human 
relationships were governed by natural laws that guided past actions and predicted 
future social directions. The credit afforded Khaldoun, as well as the discussions on 
natural law, has been deleted from the 1981 edition of this praiseworthy sociology 
text. See MELVIN L. DEFLEUR ET AL., SOCIOLOGY: HUMAN SOCIETY 4-5 (197.3). 
7. 2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas 748-
89 (Anton C. Pegis, ed., 194fi). 
8. 2 S.P. Scott, The Civil Law (1973). Justinian was the Byzantine emperor 
who codified the Roman law. 
9. Peter J. Stanlis, The Philosophic Content and Historical Importance of 
Natural Law, in EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 3-13 (1986). 
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Mter Roman political influence decreased in Europe, 
Henry de Bracton, English ecclesiastic and judge, used natural 
law concepts in merging civil and common law in England. His 
treatment of the subject had no rival until the classic legal 
Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone were circulated and 
discussed five centuries later. 10 Continuing with the natural 
law and natural rights theme in England, the 
formalist-philosopher Thomas Hobbes was convinced these laws 
and rights were separate entities. He believed that the rights of 
nature were attached to individuals, who may exercise them or 
rightfully cede them to the sovereign. II Viewed widely as a 
materialist, Hobbes favored an absolute monarchy with power 
and rights descending from above. Edmund Burke, one of 
England's most prolific legal scholars, believed that natural law 
was embodied in the customs of the land but were transmitted 
through legal precedence and procedures. To Burke, these laws 
and rights were products of convention, not attributes of 
birthright. 12 However, Jeremy Bentham refmed to consider 
the existence of rights beyond the government. Bentham 
dismissed natural and imprescriptible rights as "rhetorical 
nonsense, nonsense upon stilts."I3 
In contrast to the authoritarian Hobbes, John Locke 
favored the more liberal interpretation that natural rights were 
developed from natural laws because individuals and societies 
have a moral duty to preserve the non-transferable rights of 
life, liberty and sovereignty, and preservation.I4 According to 
Locke, reason guided each person out of harm's way and 
protected everyone against encroachment from one another. 
This rational social contract grew out of the tradition of natural 
law and, in part, required each person to give up a degree of 
independence for the betterment of all. This is also a strong 
theme in Blackstone's writings. These natural, individual 
rights and the ability of the collective citizenry to restrict and 
support governmental powers, as envisioned by common law, 
Locke, and Blackstone, 15 found their way into the English Bill 
of Rights ( 1689 ), the American Declaration of Independence 
10. !d. at 10-11. 
11. MICHAEL FREEDEN, RIGHTS 12-14 (1991). 
12. !d. at 16-17. 
13. !d. at 11'!-19. 
14. !d. at 14-16. 
15. For an excellent commentary on European enlightenment, natural rights, 
and common law leading to American independence, see ROBERT S. PECK, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS & THE POUTICS OF INTERPRETATION 2:-J-3::l (1992). 
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(1776), the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), the U. S. 
Constitution (1789), and the federal Bill of Rights (1791). 16 
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, held in 
Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation, the 
assemblage had authorization from the state legislatures to 
adopt a new form of government. In drafting the proposed 
federal constitution, our colonial fathers omitted the concepts of 
natural rights and natural laws, thereby creating the potential 
unwanted consequences of ( 1) not obtaining state ratification of 
the pact or (2) holding a second convention to reconsider the 
individual rights issue. 17 To avoid either of these possibilities, 
the politically-entrenched Federalists were forced to support 
the addition of a bill of rights, which would take the form of 
amendments. In staunch opposition to a "dangerous" 
declaration of individual rights, Alexander Hamilton expressed 
his opinion that such a pretext of protections for citizens would 
be unenforceable and unneeded since "the Constitution is itself 
... A BILL OF RIGHTS."18 
In a move to help create a more comprehensive 
constitution, convention delegate George Mason, author of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights in the Virginia Constitution of 
1776, was unsuccessful in convincing the assembly to accept a 
bill of rights before convening. Mason's Virginia Declaration 
was the nation's first human rights document, the model for all 
subsequent declarations. He had correctly surmised that the 
American people wanted individual protection from intrusive 
governmental acts. 19 Staunch Federalist James Madison 
sensed the mood of his countrymen and, after conferring with 
Hamilton and corresponding with rights-supporter Thomas 
Jefferson in France, drafted the Bill of Rights for Congressional 
consideration and passage. The ten-amendment addition was 
accepted by the people and affixed to the Constitution in 1791, 
two years after the states had approved the original 
document. 20 
Following the nation's ratification of the new compact as a 
cornerstone of law and order, legal challenges in the federal 
16. ld. at 829-58. 
17. See, Gary Will Introduction, in THE FEDERALI&'T PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY vii-xxvii (Bantam Books 1982). 
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
19. Albert P. Blaustein and Carol Tenny, Understanding ''Rights" and Bills of 
Rights, 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 411-13 (1991). 
20. Peck, supra note 15, at 55-82. 
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structure began to surface. Initially, most of the friction was 
limited to conflicts over powers exercised by each of the three 
branches of government. Shortly thereafter, a profound political 
shock wave was felt in the young country when an individual 
citizen brought suit against a neighboring state in the third 
session of the new U. S. Supreme Court.21 The constitutional 
framers simply had not planned for a person to sue a state in 
federal court when they crafted the judicial clauses. 22 As an 
afterthought, Congress took immediate action to protect the 
states' sovereign powers by hurriedly fashioning and adopting 
the Eleventh Amendment which limits the scope of federal 
courts in addressing state matters. 23 Thereafter, individual 
citizens were directed to the state courts for relief in matters 
lacking a federal question. Challenges to governmental action 
did not become commonplace until after the Civil War when 
plaintiffs were aided by the passage of three Reconstruction 
Amendments,24 the enactment of civil rights statutes/5 and 
the adoption of new congressional powers limiting the reach of 
state action.26 
The number of persons seeking federal court protection 
from governmental acts has increased dramatically in this 
century. This increase was aided by the Supreme Court's 
development of the "incorporation" doctrine, which applied the 
Bill of Rights to the states. The Court's application of 
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
21. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
22. "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain .... " U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. "The judicial power shall extend to all 
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United 
States, and treaties made ... ; to controversies to which the United States shall 
be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and 
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of 
tbe same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST. 
art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
23. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. For a history of the amendment and its application in 
educational matters, see Lawrence Lee Oldaker and David L. Dagley, The Eleventh 
Amendment, Its History and Current Application to Schools and Universities, 72 
EDUC. LAW REP. 479, 479-487 (1992). 
24. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV. 
25. See 42 U.S.C, §§ 1971-1981 for the five Civil Rights Acts signed into law 
between 1866 and 1875. 
26. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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basis for constitutional analysis in cases involving state 
statutes which restricted free speech,~7 religious expression,28 
religious establishment,29 racially segregated schools,30 
family privacy and birth control,31 and abortion.a2 This 
movement has caused spirited debates between libertarians 
who support jurists looking to sources outside of the 
Constitution to enforce unwritten natural rights and others 
who seek evidence of the framers' original intent in perceiving 
judicial limits. The more liberal activists press central 
government agencies for help in protecting perceived natural 
law rights to life, liberty, property, and especially since the 
1960s, the modern law dimension of privacy. Conservative 
"Originalists" favor limiting judges by citing the plan of the 
convention and the precise wording of the Constitution and 
written statutes.33 
While the concept of natural rights permeates American 
society, the critical issue is how courts identify and authorize 
unenumerated human rights. In the United States today a 
conservative Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist is a highly visible focal point of this 
debate. The Rehnquist Court demonstrates the propensity for 
applying conservative interpretations to the law and reversing 
the holdings of the more-activist Warren and Burger Courts. 
This shift in judicial philosophy was evident in the clash of 
Libertarian-Originalist's values which surfaced during the 
late-1987 Senate Judicial Committee hearings on the 
nomination of Robert Bork to the high court. At issue was the 
candidate's perception of the judicial role when addressing the 
grievances of individuals against perceived governmental 
wrongs, thus giving rise to the question of unenumerated 
natural rights. Judge Bork's nomination was rejected, in part, 
because of his reservations about incorporating standards of 
27. Gitlow v. New York, 26R U.S. 6fi2 (192fi); see Todd Brewster, First & 
Foremost, LIFE, Fall 1991, at 61; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 642 (19RR). 
28. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
29. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
30. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483 (19fi4). 
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196fi). 
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
33. For superior commentaries on these contrasting concepts, see Suzanna 
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, fi4 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987) and 
Helen K Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionali:;m: 
Did The Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of '"Unwritten'' Individual 
Riphts?, 69 N.C.L. REV. 421 (1991). 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
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equal protection not enumerated in constitutional and statutory 
laws. Bork has said, "[t]he clash over my nomination was 
simply one battle in this long-running war for control of our 
legal culture."34 Later, in 1991, Circuit Court Jurist Clarence 
Thomas was approved for membership on the Court as 
successor to retiring justice Thurgood Marshall. Thomas 
survived the committee's stern questioning about his views on 
personal liberties (especially the natural right to privacy and 
women's right to obtain an abortion) as expressed in his law 
school discussions and in his earlier writings. 
In spite of the present Court's pronounced movement to the 
"right," its direction remains uncertain because future 
presidential elections carry the fresh executive's duty to 
nominate members to federal benches. Every court has had 
members near career's end. Since Justices Byron White, Harry 
Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens are all over seventy, the 
next President is likely to replace one or more of the jurists 
and to redefine the Court's balance once more.35 
III. CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENT TOWARD EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 
In our nation's educational systems, there exists an 
enormous enterprise actively involving more than half of the 
nation's population, including such broad categories as 
students, parents, employees, and governors of school policies. 
To add to the complexities of this diverse involvement, aside 
from that of interested taxpayers and private fund supporters, 
each level of public or private, scholastic or collegiate 
organization has its own distinctive client-interest groups. 
Unifying all of these interests in promoting change in 
education, for whatever purpose, has defied the efforts of 
reformers for decades. 
Researchers John Chubb and Terry Moe found the 
institutions of educational governance at fault for not solving 
educational problems because "they are also fundamental 
causes of the very problems they are supposed to be solving."36 
After reviewing how students learn in school, Chubb and Moe 
ranked three factors that influence achievement in the 
classroom: (1) student ability, (2) school organization, and (3) 
34. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPI'ING OF AMERICA 2 (1990). 
35. The Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, July 13, 1992, at 23-24. 
36. John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, The Root of the Problem, in POUTICS 
MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 1R (The Brookings Institution ed., 1990). 
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family background.37 The selection of the second factor (school 
organization) as the major focus in proposing educational 
reform heightened national interest in how society delivers 
services to children. Specifically, the attention directed at the 
quality of school structure suggested that allowing them to 
compete for demand would nourish the best, foster innovation, 
and inspire the whole-a notion Nobel laureate economist 
Milton Friedman advanced nearly forty years ago. Friedman 
thought schools were better in the past when parents had more 
influence in classroom matters. He maintained that his 
"voucher plan" would have broken the monopolistic role of 
government in financing and managing the growing public 
school network. The economist favored giving all families the 
same control over their children's schooling that affluent 
families enjoy by providing them with a choice of school 
programs and a voucher to defray the cost of educational 
services.38 These concepts appear to be reflected in a recent 
Gallup/Phi Delta Kappa poll indicating that Americans 
overwhelmingly support school choice, national testing, and 
radical reform measures as means of attaining higher 
scholastic standards. 39 
Commentators are skeptical of these reform measures. 
Specifically, Michael Fullan and Matthew Miles claim that few 
educational policy makers really know what the change process 
means.40 Little change has occurred since the mid-80s with 
the exception of advancing the privatization concept. To spur 
the nation to combat ignorance, discomfort, and other 
educational maladies, Chester Finn proposed reform to get us 
out of the "dumbth," a word he coined to define a new and 
unprecedented form of mental incapacitation which threatens 
to swamp our efforts to restore a competitive, spirited, and 
rational society.41 Finn's urgency suggests the need for 
forceful measures and reminds that all revolutions are 
disruptive, though not all revolutions are necessarily violent.42 
This call for revolutionary action to improve schools was 
furthered by President Bush when he stated: "To those who 
37. !d. at 140. 
3R. ROSE AND MILTON FRIEDMAN,FREE To CHOOSE 1fifi-188 (1990). 
::!9. Dennis P. Doyle, America 2000, PHI DELTA KA.PPAN, Nov. 1991, at 186. 
40. Michael G. Fullan and Matthew B. Miles, Gettinp Rre{orm Ripht: What 
Works and What Doesn't, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, June 1992, at 74fi. 
41. CHES'TER E. FINN, JR., WE MUST TAKE CHARGE 12 (1991). 
42. Id. at 239. 
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want to see real improvement in American education, I say: 
There will be no renaissance without revolution. We who would 
be revolutionaries must accept responsibilities for our schools. 
It's time we held our schools-and ourselves-accountable for 
results. "43 
After setting the nation's sights on the six ambitious 
national education goals, President Bush addressed the 
centerpiece of "America 2000" by hinting that parents have 
natural rights and these rights include school choice. President 
Bush stated 
We can encourage educational excellence by encouraging parental 
choice. The concept of choice draws its fundamental strength from the 
principle at the very heart of the democratic idea. Every adult 
American has the right to vote, the right to decide where to work, 
where to live. It's time parents were free to choose the school that their 
children attend. 44 
At face value, this last statement seems to claim a "natural" 
right to privacy for parents to select the manner in which they 
raise children and prepare them for the world of work, an 
ideological return to an English common law theme. Should this 
claim become a serious consideration; is educational choice one 
of these natural rights? The President's legislative proposals to 
the Congress did not expand this line of reasoning. As school 
choice measures are being considered in Congress and in state 
legislatures, it is uncertain if the nation's parents and guardians 
have embraced the unenumerated right that has been suggested 
is theirs. Regardless of the political issue of rights, some 
commentators45 contend that individual choice may have 
positive consequences. 
U. S. House of Representatives Bill No. 4324, the 
Neighborhood School Improvement Act, is similar to Senate Bill 
No. 2. Both of these Bush Administration proposals, in part, 
requested funds to establish America 2000's "535 lighthouse 
schools" and to provide incentive money to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of educational choice programs involving private 
schools. Congress favored much broader reforms than those of 
merely assisting one school system in each congressional district. 
Senate and House action on the measures specifically deleted 
43. DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., AMERICA 2000, AN AMERICAN STRATEnY 
SOURCEBOOK 3-4 (1990) (President Bush's Remarks). 
44. ld. at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
45. Mark G. Yudof, et al., Educational Policy and the Law 427 (1992). 
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monetary requests for choice programs that included private 
schools. It is clear that there is a willingness to debate the issue 
of choice, and it will continue to be hotly contested within the 
Washington Beltway as well as in each state. 46 
Education Secretary Alexander, who supports America 2000 
proposals with bedrock conviction, has professed that private 
school choice, admittedly a controversial issue, will soon become 
an accepted fact of national life. In noting Alexander's resolve, 
however, researcher George Kaplan conducted a prolonged and 
fruitless search to find a trace of Alexander's past allegiances to 
choice, either as governor or university presidentY 
Paul Jung, president of the American Association of School 
Administrators, criticized the narrow political agenda of vouchers 
and testing as a prelude to a national curriculum, a potential 
that will surely arouse contemporary antifederalists embracing 
the Constitution's Tenth Amendment reserve powers clause. 
Equally skeptical of the administration's proposal, veteran urban 
educator Judith Harper suggested that voucher plans would 
perpetuate existing inequalities and be especially hurtful to 
inner-city children and minorities that would have few true 
schooling alternatives from which to choose. Harper singled out 
the ones operating in Milwaukee,48 the first educational choice 
plan to involve non-public schools and to be challenged in court. 
Milwaukee parents challenged Herbert J. Grover,49 
Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Wisconsin, 
because he was perceived to be frustrating the legislative will to 
implement the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), 
which would permit children from low-income families to attend 
nonsectarian private schools. According to the Wisconsin statute, 
the MPCP would create public funding for kindergarten through 
twelfth grade children from low-income families residing within 
the Milwaukee city limits to attend any nonsectarian private 
school in the city at no charge to the student. Each child was to 
receive a tuition grant limited to $2,500 while attending an 
approved private school, if the enrolling institution demonstrated 
that it met at least one of the following standards: (1) it had at 
46. John F. Jennings, Major Education Bills in Congress, PDK LEniSLATIVE 
NEWSLETTER, Juen 1992,at 3-4. 
47. George Kaplan, Lamar Alexander and the Politics of School Reform, PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN, June 1992, at 71i4. 
4H. Judith A. Harper, Where in the World Is Lamar Ale:xander?, PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN, June 1992, at 762-3. 
49. Davis v. Grover, 4HO N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). 
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least 70% of the pupils in the program advancing one grade each 
year, (2) it had an attendance of 90% or more for the 
participating program students, (3) it had at least 80% of the 
program pupils demonstrating significant academic progress, or 
(4) it had at least 70% of the families of pupils in the program 
meet parent involvement criteria established by the private 
school. Further stipulations regulating participation in the 
MPCP addressed family income level, residency, public school 
membership prior to participation, health and safety code 
compliance, and nonsectarian private school assurances of 
nondiscrimination. 50 The program was acknowledged to be 
experimental, limiting membership to 1,000 pupils at a cost of 
$2.5 million to the State of Wisconsin. Each private school could 
enroll no more than 49% of its students from the MPCP.51 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court realized the importance of the 
MPCP to the state and its significance to the nation as well. In 
crafting judicial approval of the choice plan, the court displayed 
a degree of pride in Wisconsin's "innovation and willingness to 
lead the nation in its attempts to further improve the quality of 
education and life."52 The decision turned aside charges ( 1) that 
the MPCP violated state constitutional private/local legislation 
clauses by embracing more than one subject;53 (2) that the 
MPCP's participating nonsectarian private schools violated the 
state's school uniformity clause that ensures comparable equity 
among the public schools,54 and (3) that the experimental 
program lacked a public purpose. 55 In concluding that the 
Milwaukee choice program passes constitutional scrutiny in all 
issues, the opening and closing sentences of Justice Ceci's 
concurring opinion indicates the tenor of the court's decision. He 
said, "Let's give choice a chance!"56 
IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
QUESTIONS 
Despite sustained criticism that the reform effort is not a 
single panacea to public school ills,57 the Milwaukee educational 
50. ld. at 46:l. 
51. ld. at 464. 
52. ld. at 462-63, n. 2. 
53. ld. at 465-73. 
54. ld. at 47.3-4. 
55. ld. at 474-7. 
56. ld. at 477-R. 
57. Julie K. Underwood, Choice is Not a Panacea, 71 ED. LAW REP. 599 (1992). 
,..,. 
; ' 
... 
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choice plan has been given a chance. In light of this, several 
issues must be addressed. Does education qualify for 
fundamental protection under federal constitutional law? Will 
the Federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment unenumerated 
rights powers grant legitimacy to school choice plans? Should 
choice in schooling be viewed as an emerging Ninth Amendment 
issue, how will education coexist under other constitutional 
amendments? These questions must be examined in light of the 
Supreme Court's decisions concerning present day school 
operations. 
Social fervor surrounding the identification and requested 
enforcement of natural school rights appears more intense in 
some eras and less important in others. Although there is a 
current, pronounced willingness by individuals to press central 
governmental agencies for help in seeking protection of these 
perceived natural rights, few have advanced the theory that 
education is such an unenumerated right. Unspecified rights are 
difficult to identify, analyze, and apply to general populations, 
especially when human behaviors differ so widely. One precept 
maintains that substantive due process or rights protected under 
the Ninth Amendment, not expressly found in the literal words 
of the constitution, must be widely recognized in our history and 
basic values. A federal district court in Kentucky ruled that the 
right to a free, public education was not such a fundamental 
right rooted in history. The court's reasoning went on to 
speculate that a state could even abolish its school systems, if 
done in a nondiscriminatory manner. 58 In expressing skepticism 
about the fundamental nature of education, Barbara Stengel 
openly confessed an absence of "love for the natural law/natural 
rights theory in general and certainly no sense that there is, in 
any way, a right to education apart from particular social and 
legal circumstances." However, she proceeded to structure an 
analysis of "right to education" as an often-used and an 
equally-understood phrase reflecting a manner of speech and a 
description of subjective, personal experiences. 59 
Apart from the comment by President Bush60 supporting 
the possibility of school choice being a natural and sheltering 
right, in 1984 Chester Nolte advanced a theory that, in the 
future, students may have a "right to know" included in the 
fiR Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F. Supp. 1087 (D.C. Ky. 1981). 
59. Barbara Senkowski Stengel, JUST EDUCATION, THE RmHT TO EDUCATION IN 
CONTEXT AND CONVERSATION 4-fi (1991). 
60. DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., supra, note 43. 
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unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment of the 
Constitution.61 Nolte referred specifically to the Tinker 
acknowledgment that students are "persons" under the 
Constitution.62 He further speculated that they may obtain 
court protection in receiving instruction and selecting written 
materials as a part of their right under Justice Douglas' 
penumbra theory, 63 an unexplored aspect of constitutional law 
until the Supreme Court broached the topic in 1965. 
Virtually ignored in the first two hundred years of U.S. 
Constitutional law, the Ninth Amendment was first given effect 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,64 an opinion that overturned a 
Connecticut statute as an unconstitutional invasion of marital 
privacy. In the opinion of the court, and somewhat aside from the 
topic under appeal, the constitutional importance of education 
was affirmed. Justice Douglas stated 
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in 
the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the 
parents' choice--whether public or private or parochial-is also not 
mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or 
language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include 
certain of those rights. By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to 
educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States 
by the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. 
Nebraska, the same dignity is given the right to study the German 
language in private school. In other words, the state may not, 
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, limit the 
spectrum of available knowledge.65 
A concurring opinion in Griswold written by Justice Goldberg 
and supported by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, 
completed the first identification of ninth amendment 
constitutional rights. 
My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted and that 
it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not 
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both by 
numerous decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court's opinion, 
and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment .... I add 
these words to emphasize the relevance of that Amendment to the 
61. Chester Nolte, The Student's Need to Know What is Out There: An Emerging 
Ninth Amendment Right, 15 EDUC. LAW REP. 1043 (19R4). 
62. !d. at 1045. 
63. !d. at 1047-49. 
64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
65. !d. at 482. 
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Court's holdin.· .... The Amendment is almost entirely the work of 
James Madison. It was introduced in Congress by him and passed the 
House and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change in 
language. It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of 
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover 
all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights 
would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected.6G 
In continuing the judicial exploration of the Griswold theme, 
a 1972 Supreme Court ruling extended the penumbra of the 
Ninth Amendment to protect the sexual privacy of unmarried 
couples.67 This ruling caused critics to complain that the high 
court improperly expanded the sanctity of the marital bedroom 
into a general right to shelter sexual relations for unwedded 
couples as well. 68 The most widely discussed privacy rights 
ruling occurred one year later as the Court's majority extended 
the protection to include the right of women to terminate their 
pregnancy by surgical abortion. Fewer rulings in the history of 
American jurisprudence have generated as much fervent and 
widespread controversy as Roe v. Wade. 69 It confronted deeply 
religious and highly personal convictions. 
Setting aside the flag-burning confrontations, Roe may be 
second only to the Brown school desegregation in social impact 
and comparable to the school prayer curbs in Murray. 70 
Further, Roe was the high water mark of the privacy rights 
decisions and has been embraced by liberal activists but 
denounced by the more conservative legal scholars. Its full 
"liberty" application has been limited by subsequent rulings, 71 
yet it has not been completely overtumed by the Rehnquist 
Court in the face of strong criticism by Justice Scalia72 and 
vocal critics not seated on the Court. 
Applying fundamental rights to protect privacy rights in the 
sex-related cases discussed above did not afford protection for a 
Georgian who engaged in homosexual sodomy73 within the 
confines of his bedroom. In the opinion of the court, the reach of 
66. ld. at 486-89. 
67. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40fi U.S. 438 (1972). 
68. Peck, supra note 1fi, at 302. 
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
70. Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution 114 (1990). 
71. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 2276 (CA 3 No. 
90-1662) (Oct. 21, 1991). 
72. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. fi02 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
n. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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the freedoms established in the Pierce and Meyer educational 
cases and the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe trilogy bore no 
resemblance to the constitutional claim of homosexuals seeking 
protection to engage in acts of sodomy.74 Three justices in 
strong dissent claimed the case was not about "a fundamental 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy" as the Court declared; 
rather, the case was about "the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men, namely, 'the right to be 
let alone."'75 
The recent decisions of the Court indicate a growing majority 
of the members sitting on the present Court are beginning to 
limit tlie incorporation of ''liberty" interests and privacy rights as 
a standard to be applied by federal courts in judging state action, 
thus leaving petitioners to seek protection within the liberties 
expressed in their state constitutions. The expansive judicial role 
attractive to activist judges eager to apply unenumerated rights 
to contemporary issues before the courts may be diminishing. 
The problematic task of identifying those rights remains. 76 
Beyond the decreasing chances of asserting a Ninth 
Amendment natural rights claim to education or school choice, 
further considerations should be directed to state laws. Since the 
Tenth Amendment was also intended to operate in tandem with 
the Ninth to protect the unenumerated rights of the states and 
their people against federal encroachment,77 state governments 
which operate public systems through their executive branch are 
the logical place to seek favor in requesting the desired school 
program. Since the U.S. Constitution fails to mention public 
education as an explicit duty of the federal government, the 
operation of schools has always been relegated to the states. All 
states have "incorporated in the education articles of their 
constitution that part of republican theory which holds education 
essential to self-government ... .'m] States have assumed the 
duty to educate in their constitutions and have assumed the 
74. !d. at 190-9. 
75. !d. at 199 (citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
76. For further readings regarding Ninth Amendment history, see Thomas B. 
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 CnLUM. L. REV. 1215 
(1990); Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth Amendment, ii9 FORDHAM L. REV. ii97 
(1991). 
77. Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment arul lti-! Implication 
for State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1990). 
78. Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Ripht to Education 
Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 97-98 (1989). 
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practical financial responsibility for schools as well. 79 
It is important to note, in reflecting on Federalist 
philosophy, that several states had constitutional documents 
guaranteeing citizen rights prior to the Philadelphia 
constitutional convention. Perhaps the founders had visions of 
states solving their provincial issues when structuring our 
system of federalism in the constitution. As the protectionist 
shadow of the Supreme Court lessens, state law emerges as an 
important legal area to seek protection for individual rights and 
responsibilities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Natural, self-preserving behavior that protected pre-literate 
families was important for survival. With the growth of 
organized communities, many of these individualistic forms of 
protection were discarded or willingly surrendered to a sovereign 
power. Compacts that were created to address social and 
economic needs reflected on the roles of those leaders responsible 
for the care of others and the rights of individual members 
within the community. Although societies vary greatly, most 
have retained elements of natural rights for personal protection, 
growth, and survival. The issue of natural rights and laws, 
considered to be essential in sustaining life, continually surfaces 
when individuals feel threatened by the actions of others or by 
the governing body. Our federal constitution, as well as the 
written compact in each state, specifies certain rights and 
responsibilities that regulate behavior within the commonwealth. 
From time to time an issue will surface that is not expressly 
covered among the list of safeguards that protect individuals. 
When this happens, those claiming shelter from intrusive action 
may claim a fundamental or natural right as a shield from 
perceived harm. 
Parents raising their children and providing for their 
education become upset when schools, for whatever existing or 
imagined reasons, conflict with or fail to satisfy family objectives. 
The current tumult surrounding public education demonstrates 
widespread dissatisfaction. Increasing numbers of households 
with children in school are resentful of the slow progress of 
reform measures to attain increased academic achievement and 
financial efficiencies. Although private schools have been in 
79. !d. at 9H. 
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operation since colonial days, the use of non-public schools as 
leverage to force public school improvements has created heated 
controversy. Responding to public school critics, a growing 
number of governmental officials have proposed a plan for 
educational choice that includes fmancial support for any student 
to attend a non-public as well as a public school. 
Reflecting on an early common law heritage, we are now 
forced to consider whether natural or fundamental rights to 
liberty and privacy form the basis of a successful constitutional 
claim of support for the educational choice plans being 
considered in Congress and in state legislatures. A review of 
judicial trends that incorporate Bill of Rights protection in state 
action and that acknowledge the existence of unenumerated 
constitutional rights suggests that federal intervention in state 
matters is decreasing. The current judicial posture under federal 
laws leads to the conclusion that students do not have a natural 
right to education, nor do their parents have a natural right to 
school choice. The attractiveness of Ninth Amendment doctrine 
does not support either proposition. This element of federalism 
relegates questions of public education and the issue of school 
choice to the states, both through the expressed design of the 
Tenth Amendment and the inclusion of education as an innate 
function of the state legislatures. The first school choice plan to 
be challenged rightfully appeared in a state court system, where 
state constitutional and statutory laws were weighted relative to 
the specifics of the choice plan. The precise wording of each state 
constitution and its applicable statutes appears to be the 
reference point in evaluating the merits of educational choice 
programs as a means of bringing about meaningful public school 
reform. 
